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Cognitive errors assessed by observer ratings in bipolar affective
disorder: relationship with symptoms and therapeutic alliance
Abstract
The construct of cognitive errors is clinically relevant for cognitive therapy of mood disorders. Beck's
universality hypothesis postulates the relevance of negative cognitions in all subtypes of mood
disorders, as well as positive cognitions for manic states. This hypothesis has rarely been empirically
addressed for patients presenting bipolar affective disorder (BD). In-patients (n = 30) presenting with
BD were interviewed, as were 30 participants of a matched control group. Valid and reliable
observer-rater methodology for cognitive errors was applied to the session transcripts. Overall, patients
make more cognitive errors than controls. When manic and depressive patients were compared, parts of
the universality hypothesis were confirmed. Manic symptoms are related to positive and negative
cognitive errors. These results are discussed with regard to the main assumptions of the cognitive model
for depression; thus adding an argument for extending it to the BD diagnostic group, taking into
consideration specificities in terms of cognitive errors. Clinical implications for cognitive therapy of BD
are suggested.
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Abstract. The construct of cognitive errors is clinically relevant for cognitive therapy
of mood disorders. Beck’s universality hypothesis postulates the relevance of negative
cognitions in all subtypes of mood disorders, as well as positive cognitions for
manic states. This hypothesis has rarely been empirically addressed for patients
presenting bipolar affective disorder (BD). In-patients (n = 30) presenting with BD
were interviewed, as were 30 participants of a matched control group. Valid and
reliable observer-rater methodology for cognitive errors was applied to the session
transcripts. Overall, patients make more cognitive errors than controls. When manic and
depressive patients were compared, parts of the universality hypothesis were confirmed.
Manic symptoms are related to positive and negative cognitive errors. These results are
discussed with regard to the main assumptions of the cognitive model for depression; thus
adding an argument for extending it to the BD diagnostic group, taking into consideration
specificities in terms of cognitive errors. Clinical implications for cognitive therapy of
BD are suggested.
Key words: Bipolar affective disorder, cognitive errors, cognitive therapy, observer-
rater method.
Introduction
Introduced in 1963 by A. T. Beck, the concept of cognitive errors (or cognitive distortion)
has become one of the central features of cognitive theory and therapy for depression (Beck,
1995; Clark et al. 1999); later, cognitive research used the term of cognitive biases, a term that
is currently in use mostly for experimentally based studies (Clark et al. 1999); in accordance
with Beck, we will refer to the term cognitive errors (CE). Beck (1963) observes that the main
suffering in depressive patients is not caused by affective disturbances, but by pervasiveness
of inaccuracy in interpreting reality – errors in logic – in such a way that the result is a
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generalized negative bias against themselves; this assumption is called ‘negativity hypothesis’
(see also Peterson & Seligman, 1984; Beck, 1991). According to the constructivist cognitive
theory (Beck, 1991; Clark et al. 1999), normal thinking does not mean complete accuracy
with reality, the latter always being an individual’s construction, but an ‘adaptive’ way of
information processing. Normal cognitive functioning is therefore characterized by a slightly
positive bias which, when the individual shifts into depressive mood, fades away and is
replaced by a negative bias. Along with a series of other hypotheses, Beck (1967, 1976,
1991; Clark et al. 1999) defines the ‘universality hypothesis’ as follows: ‘Heightened negative
cognition, reduced positive thinking, and self-referent negativity processing bias are evident
in all subtypes of depression’ (Clark et al. 1999, p. 159). With more detail for bipolar affective
disorders (BD), Beck (1991) postulates overly positive biases in individuals in manic episodes
and overly negative biases when they are in depressive episodes (see also Newman et al.
2001; Leahy, 2003). More recently, Mansell et al. (2007) developed an integrative cognitive
model for the explanation of mood swings in BD. The multi-factor model implies at least
three levels, i.e. change in internal state, appraisals and belief about self, the world and others,
on which cognitive biases, or CE may apply, underlying the omnipresence of the latter. Thus,
the present study aims at testing part of Beck’s universality hypothesis, by focusing on CE in
BD. Empirical evidence on this hypothesis will be reviewed and methodological issues related
to the assessment of cognitive processes discussed, before addressing our specific research
questions related to BD.
Results from previous empirical work on CE confirmed Beck’s hypotheses for patients
presenting unipolar depression (Clark et al. 1999). Depressed persons showed more CE than
non-depressed (Hammen & Krantz, 1976; Hammen, 1978; Krantz & Hammen, 1979). More
specifically, the category of selective abstraction yielded a particularly large between-group
difference, greater than for the category of personalization. For patients presenting lower
back pain with comorbid depression, overgeneralization was most often reported, compared
to all other errors (Lefebvre, 1981). However, the author acknowledged that the latter result
may possibly be induced by the formulation of the questionnaire, which focused on contents
related to lower back pain. As shown by Weintraub et al. (1974), CE were persistent across
phases of unipolar depression and remission, and functioned thus as a vulnerability factor in
relapse in depression-prone individuals. This effect was not found consistently (Haaga et al.
1991). An experimental mood-induction study on non-depressed subjects was conducted by
Henriques & Leitenberg (2002), who found that the ratio of negative-to-positive CE predicted
best the outcome variables (e.g. self-esteem, mood change). Even if these studies tend to
confirm Beck’s assumptions and more generally the cognitive model of unipolar depression,
it is doubtful that the results of such laboratory studies, i.e. using questionnaires, are directly
applicable to clinical contexts, such as enhancement of the cognitive case conceptualization
and the psychotherapeutic intervention (see below).
With regard to patients presenting with BD I or BD II, there is some tentative evidence
that Beck’s universality hypothesis concerning the presence of negative cognition across all
subtypes of depression, holds true (Clark et al. 1999). Weingartner et al. (1977) conduct a
word-encoding study on eight BD patients and showed that the recall was better in the case
of mood congruency, compared to mood incongruency. Eich et al. (1997) were unable to
reproduce the congruency effect on word recall (n = 10 BD rapid cyclers), but reproduced it
on autobiographical events. Cognitive coping specificities and dysfunctional attitudes in BD
have been addressed by a number of empirical studies (e.g. Greenhouse et al. 2000; Lam et al.
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2001, 2004; Johnson & Carver, 2006; Kramer et al. 2009). Recently, a questionnaire was
devised aimed at assessing hypomanic cognitions (Mansell & Jones, 2006; see also Jones
et al. 2006), which succeeded in differentiating BD patients from controls: the former presented
higher scores on cognitions related to hypomania, compared to the latter. Goldberg et al. (2008)
showed in a recent questionnaire study that core beliefs in BD patients remain negativistic
even during manic phases. These authors interpreted this pattern as possible cognitive over-
compensation of the depressive phase. Based on these studies, Mansell et al. (2007) developed
an integrative cognitive model of understanding BD. The model postulates the presence of
intense conflicting appraisals of change in the internal states, which may be both positive and
negative during the manic phase. Based on these studies and conceptual elaborations, it can
be concluded that there may be specific cognitive patterns in BD patients in terms of cognitive
biases, mainly negative biases in the depressive phase and both negative and positive biases in
the manic phase of the disorder.
Assessment of cognitive biases or errors has traditionally been done by means of self-report
measures (e.g. Lefebvre, 1981; Goldberg et al. 2008); these methods might be useful in some
contexts, on condition that the individual is aware of his or her own errors in cognitive
processing (other limitations of self-report measures are social desirability, tendency for
acquiescing and self-deception). In highly disturbed psychiatry patients, this is rarely the
case. This has led recent researchers to devise standardized experimental testing procedures
(for depression see Jermann et al. 2005). These tests, inspired by neuropsychological research
paradigms, might be useful for testing a specific hypothesis in fundamental research, but suffer
from a lack of external and ecological validity and are therefore of limited direct relevance
for psychotherapeutic practice, and also because they are based on aggregated datasets. Other
limitations of the application of neuropsychological research to psychotherapy practice are
outlined by Eells et al. (1993) and Clark et al. (1999). Finally, the CE Rating Scale (Drapeau
et al. 2005) was devised in order to compensate for the shortcomings of the two previously
mentioned research paradigms, i.e. self-reports and neuropsychological tests, and to offer valid
conceptualization of CE by using observer ratings of CE, based on transcripts of psychotherapy
sessions (see Method section).
Taking Beck’s negativity and universality hypotheses as a basis, we are in the position of
formulating the following research hypotheses: (1) BD patients display more CE, in total and
per category, than controls; (2) patients with predominantly manic symptoms display positive
and negative CE, patients with predominantly depressive symptoms display more negative
CE; (3) a higher proportion of CE in patients is associated with higher symptom level; (4) a
higher proportion of CE in patients is associated with lower levels of therapeutic alliance.
Method
Sample
A total of 30 in-patients with BD were included in the study, of which 20 (67%) were female;
the patients had a mean age of 46.1 years (S.D. = 11.2, range 21–60). Their socio-demographic
level was assessed by means of the total number of years of education in any field. On average,
the patients had 12.4 years of education (S.D. = 1.1, range 10–16). All had a DSM-IV-R
diagnosis of BD I and were included in the study irrespective of the nature of the most
recent phase or of the level of chronicity. Some (n = 13, 43%) presented comorbid disorders,
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Table 1. Socio-demographics and symptoms for patients and controls
Patients (n = 30) Controls (n = 30)
Criteria Mean S.D. Mean S.D. t(1, 58) p
Age 46.14 11.20 41.90 14.33 1.28 0.12
Education (no. of years) 12.37 1.07 12.87 1.42 −1.59 0.21
Gender (female) 67% 67%
Intimate relationshipa 37% 40%
Life situation
With partner 30% 30%
With partner and siblings 3% 7%
Alone 43% 40%
Alone with siblings 10% 10%
With parents 7% 13%
Institution 7% 0%
WAI 63.04 13.96
GSI 1.24 0.87 0.48 0.23 4.47 0.00
Mania (BRMS) 3.10 2.94
Depression (MADRS) 12.87 10.40
BRMS, Bech–Rafaelson Mania Scale; MADRS, Montgomery & Asberg Depression Rating Scale;
GSI, General Symptom Index of Symptom Checklist SCL-90-R; WAI, Working Alliance Inventory.
a Considered as stable intimate relationship when lasting longer than 2 years.
such as drug abuse (23%, cannabis, alcohol, cocaine), personality disorders cluster C (10%),
obsessive–compulsive disorders (3%), acute suicidality (3%) and epilepsy (3%). Diagnoses
were established by trained staff by means of the Structured Clinical Interview for DSM-IV
(SCID; First et al. 2004; only the module on BD). The number of in-patient treatments in
psychiatry, including current treatment, varied between 1 and 29 (mean = 7.7, S.D. = 7.0).
A strictly matched control group was introduced; matching criteria were gender, age and
years of education, as these have an influence on cognitive functioning (Labouvie-Vief et al.
1987; Whitty, 2003). A total of 30 persons from a community sample were recruited for the
study, of which 20 (67%) were female; the controls had a mean age of 41.9 (S.D. = 14.3,
range 23–65). Their mean number of years of education was 12.9 (S.D. = 1.4, range 11–
18), corresponding to intermediate education level in Switzerland. No in-patient psychiatric
treatment was known for these participants and general symptomatology was in the normal
range for all control participants. t tests yielded no significant differences in the matching
variables between the groups (see Table 1). All participants gave written consent.
Instruments
CE (Drapeau, et al. 2005; French translation by Kramer & Drapeau, 2005). This is an
observer-rating system assessing CE in interview transcripts (Drapeau, & Perry, 2005). It
assesses 14 different CE, based on J. Beck (1995) and A. T. Beck (1976): (1) Fortune-telling,
(2) Labelling, (3) Overgeneralizing, (4) All-or-nothing, (5) Discounting the positive/negative,
(6) Emotional reasoning, (7) Magnification/minimization of positive/negative, (8) Mental filter,
(9) Should and must, (10) Tunnel vision, (11) Jumping to conclusions, (12) Mind-reading,
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(13) Personalization, (14) Inappropriate blaming of self. All errors are broken down according
to their valence: positive and negative. According to Lefebvre (1981), they can be classified
in four higher-order categories: fortune-telling (error 1); overgeneralizing (errors 2 and 3);
selective abstraction (errors 4–11); personalization (errors 12–14). According to Henriques &
Leitenberg (2002), an overall ratio can be computed by dividing the proportion of negative
CE by the proportion of positive CE. For all computations, relative frequencies are used, by
weighting the absolute frequency of each error by the number of words uttered by the patient
(excluding therapist interventions and patient’s hesitations) yielding a score for each error
per 1000 words. Preliminary empirical validation data have been presented in several studies,
accounting for sufficient internal and external validity (see Drapeau & Perry, 2005; D’Iuso
et al. 2007; Drapeau et al. 2007; Perry et al. 2007 for the original English version), and Kramer
(2006) and Kramer & Drapeau (in press) for the French version used for our study). For the
current study, reliability coefficients on 20% of the ratings were established among fully trained
raters and yielded satisfactory results in terms of intra-class correlation coefficients (ICC) (2,
1; Wirtz & Caspar, 2002) varying between 0.48 and 0.95 (mean = 0.80, S.D. = 0.12, the
0.48 ICC value being an exception for a particular difficult rating on a patient presenting with
psychotic symptoms, the next lowest value in this distribution was 0.62). These coefficients
were established on single errors broken down into positive and negative valence as unit of
analysis (28 categories). ICC (2, 1) with the CE authors’ group of raters varied between 0.51
and 0.83 (mean = 0.71, S.D. = 0.11; the 0.51 rating is the only one <0.60).
Symptom Check List SCL-90-R (Derogatis, 1994). This questionnaire includes 90 items
addressing various somatic and psychological signs of distress. These items are scored using
a Likert-type scale from 0 (not at all) to 4 (very much). Although the instrument is composed
of 10 subscales, our study used only the General Symptomatic Index (GSI, score ranging
from 0 to 4), which is a mean rated over all symptoms. The clinical cut-off score is 0.80. The
French validation study was carried out by Pariente & Guelfi (1990) and yielded satisfactory
coefficients. Cronbach’s alpha for this sample was 0.98. Mean symptom level for patients was
higher than for controls (see Table 1; range of our patients’ scores: 0.12–3.17).
Bech–Rafaelson Mania Scale (BRMS; Bech et al. 1978). The BRMS is a clinician-rated scale
for manic symptoms, based on 11 items tapping activity level, mood, and other characteristics
of mania. The items are rated on a scale from 0 (normal) to 4 (extreme). The clinical cut-off
score for mania is 15 (hypomania 6). The range of our patients’ scores was 0–12. Inter-rater
reliability proved to be high (0.80–0.95; Bech et al. 1978; Altman, 2004). BPRS is effective in
assessing outcome in clinical trials on BD (Bech, 2002). The French translation was validated
by Chambon et al. (1989). Cronbach’s alpha for our patient sample was 0.77.
Montgomery–Asberg Depression Rating Scale (MADRS; Montgomery & Asberg, 1979).
MADRS is a clinician-rated scale for depressive symptoms, including among others items
on sadness, internal tensions, insomnia, appetite reduction, cognitive impairment and suicidal
ideation. The 10 items are anchored on a scale from 0 (absence of symptoms) to 6 (maximal
level of symptoms). The clinical cut-off score for depression is 15. The range of our patients’
scores was 0–38. Several validation studies reported satisfactory coefficients for the original
version (Montgomery, & Asberg, 1979) and concurrent validity (Kearns et al. 1982; Maier &
Philipp, 1985). The French translation was validated by Lemperie`re et al. (1984) and validation
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studies on this version yielded satisfactory coefficients on specificity, homogeneity and internal
consistency (Pellet et al. 1987). Cronbach’s alpha for our patient sample was 0.89.
Working Alliance Inventory (WAI; Horvath, 1981; Horvath & Greenberg, 1989). The WAI
was originally a 36-item self-report measure assessing the quality of the therapeutic alliance
according Bordin’s conception (1975). Responses are reported on a 7-point Likert-type scale
ranging from 1 (never) to 7 (always). Construct validity was established by Malinckrodt &
Nelson, 1991), reliability for the whole scale ranged between 0.84 and 0.93 (Horvath, 1994).
Concurrent and predictive validity was established (Tichenor & Hill, 1989; Shick Tryon &
Kane, 1993). A 12-item short version was developed by Tracey & Kokotovic (1989), based
on factor-analytical procedures. Its French translation was validated by Corbie`re et al. (2006)
who suggested one general score be considered for the evaluation of alliance. The short version
was used for our study. Cronbach’s alpha for this patient sample was 0.87.
Procedure
All patients and controls were asked to participate in a dynamic interview (DI; Perry et al.
2005) lasting 50 minutes. DI as a research tool has been developed from clinical practice
of psychodynamic psychotherapy; thus, the context of DI is comparable to the context of
an intake psychotherapy interview (J. C. Perry, personal communication). It has been widely
used in psychotherapy research (Perry & Cooper, 1989; Hoglend & Perry, 1998). As shown by
Perry et al. (2005) and Fowler & Perry (2005), high-quality dynamic interviews are associated
with five tasks of the interviewer: (1) setting the interview frame: work-enhancing strategies;
(2) offering support: questions, support strategies, associations; (3) exploration of affect:
questions, reflections, clarifications, low-level defence interpretations; (4) trial interpretations:
defence and transference interpretations; (5) offering a synthesis.
In particular, exploring affect and trial interpretations are highly correlated with overall
dynamic interview adequacy (O-DIA), when the patient’s contribution is controlled for (Perry
et al. 2005). The first author completed an intensive 1 week’s training at Austen Riggs
Center, Stockbridge, USA, and later underwent regular supervision with senior supervisors in
psychodynamic psychotherapy. All interviews were conducted in French by the first author.
We believe that the specific tasks required from the therapist during a DI are similar to the
tasks in any psychotherapy intake interview; moreover, the interviewer is a psychotherapist
with full cognitive-behaviooral training; therefore, we assume this interview technique has a
high external validity across therapy approaches.
All in-patients participated in the DI, as soon as their symptomatic state allowed. This
means that the patients were included just prior to discharge from in-patient treatment.
Only two patients had to be excluded from the study due to non-feasibility of the research
interview; all other patients responding to the inclusion criteria and willing to participate were
included. The patients were given treatment as usual, encompassing non-specific supportive
therapy and medication according to the guidelines published by the World Federation of
Society of Biological Psychiatry (Grunze et al. 2002). Along with the DI, the evaluation
procedure encompassed clinician ratings of depression and mania. The patients were given the
questionnaires at the end of the interview and were asked to complete and return them within
2 days. The study was endorsed by the expert ethical committee of the psychiatric hospital.
The control group was recruited by means of two local institutions: (1) School of Social
Studies (n = 17); (2) ‘Femmes solidaires’ – an association promoting community activities
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and service (n = 13). Matching criteria were transparently issued at the outset of the control
group recruitment. Therefore, only nine participants were excluded from participation due to
failure to meet the matching criteria. The control participants, unlike the patients who were
not paid, received a contribution (the equivalent of US$16). The study was endorsed by the
expert ethical committee of the School of Social Studies.
All interviews were tape-recorded and transcribed by Master’s-level psychology students,
according to the method defined by Mergenthaler & Stigler (1997). Interviews were rated
based on these transcripts. CE ratings were performed by fully trained raters, including the
first author. Four Master’s-level psychology students were trained during 4 months by the first
author and reliability was established on a dyadic basis among the student raters, between
the student raters and the trainer and between the student raters and the authors of the CE
method. A randomly chosen 20% of all interviews were rated by two raters independently
in order to establish inter-rater reliability checks (for results see Instruments section
above).
Data analytical strategy
We performed ANOVA and MANOVA statistical analyses in order to answer the first two
hypotheses regarding the heightened level of CE in BD: (1) compared to controls and (2)
comparing the two BD subgroups with each other. For both hypotheses, univariate testing
was used for number of words, number of CE and the negative-to-positive ratio. For the first
hypothesis, patients were compared to controls, for the second, two subgroups of patients
were compared with each other. These subgroups were obtained by median-split method
of the ratio BRMS/MADRS (in order to be able to perform the variable transformation
for all 30 cases, the MADRS score was transformed by adding 1 to the initial score, thus
preventing the exclusion of two cases with a score of 0 on MADRS). We applied multivariate
statistics to the four categories per error valence. In order to test hypotheses 3 and 4 on
the links between the CE and (3) the level of symptoms and (4) the therapeutic alliance,
zero-order Pearson’s correlations were performed. We applied Bonferroni’s correction as
necessary.
Results
Preliminary analyses
The total number of words was constantly higher for controls, compared to patients. For the
first interview, patients had a mean of 5955 words (S.D. = 1903), controls 7810 words [S.D. =
2514, F(1, 59) = 10.61, p = 0.00]. Comparing the depression subgroup to the mania subgroup
(both n = 15), the mania subgroup produced more words (mean = 6835, S.D. = 1903) than
the depression subgroup [mean = 5037, S.D. = 1207, F(1, 29) = 8.38, p = 0.01].
CE in BD patients vs. controls
After controlling for the number of words produced, only one between-group effect remained
significant: patients overall made more errors of any type than controls (p < 0.05). No effect
was found with regard to the specific categories, nor the negative-to-positive valence ratio (see
Table 2).
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Table 2. Cognitive errors/1000 words in bipolar affective disorder
Patients (n = 30) Controls (n = 30)
Errors Mean S.D. Mean S.D. F (1, 59)
Effect
size
Number of errors 15.87 6.60 12.50 4.88 5.04∗ 0.58
Ratio (neg./pos.) 2.53 2.82 1.77 1.51 1.55 0.34
Positive errors
Fortune-telling 0.17 0.46 0.27 0.58 0.54 0.19
Overgeneralizing 5.54 7.43 8.45 8.67 1.95 0.36
Selective abstraction 36.87 44.34 28.48 24.18 0.83 0.24
Personalization 1.02 2.75 0.53 2.05 0.62 0.20
Negative errors
Fortune-telling 0.60 0.89 0.33 0.61 1.83 0.35
Overgeneralizing 13.90 11.49 13.72 11.64 0.00 0.02
Selective abstraction 35.61 17.38 27.79 31.22 1.44 0.31
Personalization 5.60 8.03 5.39 7.42 0.01 0.03
MANOVA: Positive errors: F(4, 55) = 1.44, p = 0.23; negative errors: F(4, 55) = 0.85, p = 0.50;
Bonferroni’s correction applied.
∗p < 0.05.
CE in BD patients: mania vs. depression
When dividing the patient group according to the predominant symptomatology, mania or
depression, it appeared that the negative-to-positive valence ratio was highly significant: BD
patients with depressive symptoms had a higher ratio, compared to BD patients with manic
symptoms. Moreover, in line with this first result, patients with manic symptoms displayed
more positive errors compared to patients with depressive symptoms; in particular, the category
of selective abstraction, e.g. emotional reasoning, jumping to conclusions, magnification of
the positive, was different between the two subgroups. However, no difference was found in
negative errors (see Table 3). There were no between-subgroup differences as regards socio-
demographic variables [gender: χ2(1; n = 15) = 3.33, n.s.; age: t(1, 28) = −1.11, n.s.; level
of education: t(1, 28) = 0.17, n.s.].
CE and level of symptoms
Pearson correlational analyses yielded a clear picture for manic symptoms that were related to
the level of positive errors (r = 0.57, p = 0.00). Depressive symptoms were inversely related
to positive errors (r = −0.53, p = 0.00), but not to negative ones (see Table 4). Due to the
relative small sample size, these analyses are exploratory.
CE and therapeutic alliance
We performed a Pearson correlation between WAI and the CE positive and negative scores;
the total number of observations was lower due to missing values (n = 24). A significant
negative correlation existed between positive CE and the therapeutic alliance measured by WAI
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Table 3. Cognitive errors/1000 words as a function of symptomatic subsamples
Depression (n = 15) Mania (n = 15)
Errors Mean S.D. Mean S.D. F(1, 29)
Effect
size
Number of errors 14.93 5.64 16.80 7.52 0.59 0.28
Ratio (neg./pos.) 4.04 3.43 1.12 0.74 10.37∗∗ 1.18
Positive errors
Fortune-telling 0.07 0.26 0.27 0.59 0.89 0.44
Overgeneralizing 4.25 8.53 6.82 6.17 0.89 0.35
Selective abstraction 15.56 12.30 58.18 54.30 8.79∗∗ 1.08
Personalization 0.97 2.71 1.07 2.89 0.01 0.04
Negative errors
Fortune-telling 0.73 1.10 0.47 0.64 0.66 0.29
Overgeneralizing 12.37 11.42 15.07 11.80 0.41 0.23
Selective abstraction 28.93 10.70 26.66 22.55 0.12 0.13
Personalization 6.35 6.71 4.43 9.30 0.42 0.24
MANOVA: Positive errors: F(4, 25) = 2.29, p = 0.05; negative errors: F(4, 25) = 0.43, p = 0.78;
Bonferroni’s correction applied (significance level 0.01/2 or 0.05/2).
∗∗p < 0.01.
Table 4. Pearson’s correlations between manic/depressive symptoms and
cognitive errors (n = 30)
Cognitive errors
Variable Positive Negative
Bech–Rafaelson Mania Scale 0.57∗∗ 0.22
Montgomery–Asberg Depression
Rating Scale
−0.53∗∗ 0.07
∗∗p < 0.01.
(r = −0.50, p = 0.01), whereas no relationship was found between negative CE and WAI
(r = −0.24, p = 0.26).
Discussion
Our hypotheses were generally confirmed by the results. By testing a first sub-version of
the universality hypothesis, we have shown that BD patients display overall more CE in
their spontaneous in-session narrative than matched controls. However, no effect was found
per error valence between the groups. These results indicate that the symptoms related to
the BD diagnosis suffice for detection of an overall heightened level of CE, but not for the
detection of differences in specific categories (Clark et al. 1999); potential effects are probably
neutralized in such between-group comparisons by partially exclusive symptom patterns. The
latter are particularly decisive in BD patients, as mania and depression fluctuate highly,
sometimes rapidly; in consequence, these state-dependent parameters need to be entered as
separate analyses. When comparing the two symptomatic subgroups with each other, the effect
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of overall frequency of errors disappears, but the negative-to-positive valence ratio yields
an effect which tends to confirm, again, the universality hypothesis for bipolar depression
(Henriques & Leitenberg, 2002; see also Clark et al. 1999). Selective abstraction positivity is
more frequent in manic patients, but no between-subgroup difference was found for negative
CE, due to a relatively high level of negative CE in mania. Correlational analyses confirm
that manic symptoms in BD patients are not only characterized or maintained by heightened
positive thinking (i.e. selective abstraction), but also by heightened negative thinking (i.e.
overgeneralizing). These results also tend to confirm Beck’s exclusivity hypothesis for BD
(Clark et al. 1999) stating that depression is characterized by the absence of positive self-
referent thinking. However, the absence of effect related to negative CE in the depressive
phase – due to heightened negative CE in mania rendering this likely effect insignificant –
questions the generalizability to BD of Beck’s negativity hypothesis. Biases towards
particularly negative information processing and content are widely confirmed for unipolar
depression, but negativity in depressive states in BD patients is not heightened when compared
to manic or hypomanic states, and also when compared to matched controls. These heightened
levels of negative errors in manic states might be due to persistence of negativity across BD
phases, representing a vulnerability factor for relapse into depression (see also comparable
results found by Goldberg et al. 2008 in a questionnaire-study and by Weintraub et al. 1974
on unipolar depression). As predicted by Mansell et al.’s (2007) model, negativity may be
present as part of extreme conflicting cognition (positive vs. negative) in particular in mania.
This recent cognitive model enables differentiation of cognitive biases with regard to their
content: in particular, errors in interpretation of the internal physical state may be analysed,
as opposed to CE on any content (i.e. world, relationships, personal history) and related to
current symptoms, e.g. the presence of ascent and descent behaviours (Mansell et al. 2007).
The clinical method applied in our study may prove particularly useful for the validation of
this model assumption.
With regard to the therapeutic alliance, we were able to partially confirm our hypothesis.
Only positive CE are inversely related to the level of therapeutic alliance, no relationship
was found for positive errors. This result, based on exploratory analyses, may suggest a
limiting role of heightened levels of CE in the development of a therapeutic alliance with the
patient.
There are at least two clinical implications ensuing from the present study. First, clinicians
should be aware of the occurrence of cognitive biases in their BD patients, since higher
levels of symptoms are related to some types of cognitive biases. While the observation
in manic and hypomanic patients of their discounting negative information is probably a
truism for clinicians, the underlying presence, in the same patients, of a set of negative CE
also related to mania, may be counter-intuitive. Therefore, this should be emphasized in
the training of cognitive psychotherapists, to avoid them remaining in their own possible
positively valenced CE, i.e. discounting the negative information. The second implication is
the clinician’s awareness of selective abstraction as a possible hindrance in the construction of
a positive therapeutic alliance. Even if BD patients show many positive selective abstraction
errors, possibly also with regard to the therapeutic relationship, the clinician needs to address
them systematically, i.e. by means of Socratic dialogue. It goes without saying that this
procedure does not imply replacing positivity by negativity (or vice versa), but it implies
the collaborative therapeutic negotiation of a nuanced and adaptive view of the self and the
self-in-interaction (Clark et al. 1999).
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To summarize, BD patients display a higher frequency of CE than controls. Manic symptoms
are associated with more positive CE, as well as negative CE, thus adding an argument for
corroboration of Beck’s universality and exclusivity hypotheses. No effect was found for
negative CE in bipolar depression.
There are several limitations to this study. Comorbidity in the patient sample somewhat limits
internal validity of the trial, but enhances external validity. It should be acknowledged that
no patient presented full manic symptoms according to the clinical cut-off, thus confining
the relevance of our results to patients in submanic or hypomanic states; caution with
generalizations to fully manic states needs to be applied. Finally, participants in the control
group were not randomly chosen, due to matching criteria and the voluntary status of
participation and thus, their error profiles are not representative of the general population;
caution with generalizations should be exercised.
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Learning objectives
(1) Cognitive errors (or cognitive biases) may be assessed reliably in clinical interview by
means of observer-rater methodology.
(2) Patients with bipolar affective disorder use more cognitive errors in their spontaneous
discourse than non-symptomatic controls.
(3) Manic symptoms not only relate to positive cognitive errors, but also to negative
cognitive errors, which should be taken into account in CBT of bipolar affective
disorder.
